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AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A MODEL 
OXYMORON, OR WHO KNEW THE 
CONSTITUTION ENSHRINED 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR STATES? 
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS lliE AMERICAN CONsnruDON! 
By Robert A. Dahl.1 New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
2001. Pp. 208. Hardcover, $19.95 
Miranda Oshige McGowan2 
"How democratic is the American constitution?" Dahl asks. 
Well, in 2000, for the fourth time in our history, the presidential 
candidate with the most votes lost. And for the second time in 
our history, the Supreme Court-the deliberately non-
democratic branch of our government-decided the election.3 
Within six months after the election, few seemed terribly both-
ered by the election's outcome. Indeed, only a tiny majority of 
Americans said in 2001 that they wanted to replace the Electoral 
College with direct, popular election of the president4 -down 
from seventy-seven percent who wanted to abolish it in 1988.5 
(That's right: more people wanted to abolish the electoral col-
lege in 1988, when George H.W. Bush thrashed Michael Du-
kakis, than after the 2000 election.) We also seem to love our 
constitution. Seventy-one percent of Americans said in 1991 that 
I. Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Yale University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
3. The first time was in 1876 in the Hayesffilden election. Florida was at the cen-
ter of that contested election as well. Five justices of the Supreme Court along with five 
Senators and five members of the House made up the Electoral Commission that re-
solved the disputed state election results in Florida, Oregon, South Carolina, and Louisi-
ana. 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (Supplement) xv (1988). 
4. See R. Michael Alvarez, et al., American Opinion on Election Reform, May 10, 
2001, available at http://survey.caltech.edu/reform4.pdf at 3 (reporting that only 52% of 
respondents supported replacing the electoral college with direct election of the presi-
dent). 
5. See http:J/www.ncpa.orgiopedlbartlett/nov2aXl.html (referencing 1988 ABOWashington 
Post Poll). 
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"they strongly agreed with the statement that they were proud of 
the Constitution" (p. 122). How can this be so when our system 
doesn't seem to be terribly democratic? 
According to Robert Dahl, the failure of democracy in the 
2000 election was not just a freak occurrence or a surprise out-
come of an otherwise well-functioning-though idiosyncratic-
democratic system that happens every century or so, like earth-
quakes on the East Coast. Rather, the 2000 election was simply 
the most egregious outcome of what Dahl contends are funda-
mental democratic failures in our constitutional scheme. These 
defects make us the least democratic of the world's representa-
tive democracies, which provokes Dahl to ask why we have any 
obligation at all to follow our constitution. 
WHAT OBLIGATES US TO FOLLOW A CONSTITUTION 
DRAFTED AND RATIFIED BY A BUNCH OF OLD, 
DEAD, WHITE, MALE PROPERTY OWNERS? 
Social contract theory has a hard time explaining Ameri-
cans' present-day obligations, and Dahl finds social contract the-
ory implausible as a general matter (p. 2). Even at the time of 
the Constitution's adoption, Dahl rightly points out that social 
contract theory runs into problems: voters were all-white and all-
male, which calls into question the extent to which the Constitu-
tion (and the governmental action taken pursuant to it) could 
then legitimately bind all Americans on any social contract the-
ory. 
Perhaps our common commitment to the principle of major-
ity rule legitimizes our system. We seem to believe majority rule 
is the legitimate method for political decisionmaking. No lesser a 
light than James Madison said, "[T]he vital principle of republi-
can flovernment is the lex majoris parties, the will of the major-
ity" (p. 37). And if the furor in 1993 over Lani Guinier's pro-
posal that we implement proportional voting schemes to 
enhance minority representation was any indication, we are in-
credibly hostile to alternatives. From the outrage over her nomi-
nation to head the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Depart-
ment,7 one would have thought that she'd suggested means 
testing for Social Security. 
6. THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF 
JAMES MADISON 409 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973). 
7. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, More People View Clinton As Liberal As He Seeks 
Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1993, § 1, at 1 (commenting on polls taken after the "uproar 
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As it turns out, however, our system deviates from the prin-
ciple of majority rule almost more than it follows it. Most of our 
elections for national office require a candidate only to earn a 
plurality, not a majority, of the votes cast to win election. (This 
rule is sometimes called "first past the post.") In fact, in a third 
of our presidential elections, the winner was elected by a plural-
ity, rather than a majority, of voters (p. 80). It is hard to say 
whether a plurality winner is actually the one whom a majority 
of voters prefers. Had we held a run-off in the 1992 presidential 
election (which Bill Clinton won by a plurality) it is difficult to 
know whether a majority of first-round Perot voters would have 
preferred Clinton to Bush. 
The Electoral College dashes any remaining claim presiden-
tial elections have to being majoritarian. 8 States are assigned 
electoral votes based on the number of Representatives and 
Senators each state has. Less populous states have dispropor-
tionate electoral power because every state has at least one rep-
resentative and two senators regardless of population. On a per 
capita basis, a Wyoming voter (the least populous state) has al-
most four times the electoral clout as a Californian (p. 81), and 
the "ten smallest states each choose two to three times as many 
electors as they would if a state's electors were strictly in propor-
tion to its population" (pp. 81-82). Combined with the fact that 
48 states grant all of their electoral votes to the plurality winner, 
it's hardly surprising that the candidate with the most popular 
votes has lost in four elections. The only surprising thing is that it 
hasn't happened more frequently.9 
Lucky for us, majority rule has little to do with democracy 
or legitimacy, according to Dahl (p. 37). It is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for democracy to exist. Democracy doesn't require 
that the majority rule because majority voting schemes do not 
necessarily reflect combined voters' preferences when there are 
over his nomination of Lani Guinier to be the justice department's civil rights chief and 
his withdrawal of the nomination," and noting that 47 percent of Americans polled "said 
he did the right thing" while "65 percent of that group said Mr. Clinton was wrong to 
nominate Ms. Guinier in the first place"). 
8. We have tried to democratize a system for electing the president that had been 
purposefully designed by the framers to insulate the presidential election (and by exten-
sion, the president himself) from popular democratic forces. Ironically, by the 1804 elec-
tion of Thomas Jefferson over John Adams, the electoral system was failing to deliver on 
its original purpose of keeping popular politics out of the selection of the president. But 
it should not surprise us that a system that was designed to be nondemocratic and insu-
lated from popular politics will occasionally fail to reflect popular sentiment. 
9. If the Plains states continue to depopulate, it may happen more frequently in 
the future. 
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more than two candidates.10 Indeed, Arrow's Theorem suggests 
that there are no voting schemes that can produce results that 
accurately reflect individual preferences." So a rule that the ma-
jority wins may be more one of convenience or convention. Ma-
jority rule is not a sufficient condition for democracy because a 
majority could rule autocratically by passing legislation that pre-
vents minorities from voting. 12 
Dahl proposes instead that the legitimacy of any constitu-
tional scheme depends on its "utility as an instrument of democ-
ratic government" (p. 39). This criterion needs clarification: how 
do we measure how well the Constitution serves us? According 
to Dahl, the answer is the extent to which our government is 
"democratic." 13 That hardly helps, because one still needs to 
know what democracy is and have some way to measure whether 
a government is more or less democratic. Dahl spends little time 
(too little time) defining democracy in How Democratic Is the 
American Constitution?, perhaps because he covered that topic 
extensively in his book On Democracy, which, like this book, he 
wrote for a general audience.14 Because this is a crucial step in 
his argument, it is worth examining his definition of this term 
more closely. 15 
10. A quick illustration. Let's say there are three people running for dog catcher, 
Pluto, Mickey, and Goofy. If none of these candidates receives an absolute majority of 
the vote, the election rules provide that there will be a run-off between the top two vote-
getters. For simplicity's sake, let's say that there are three groups of voters who have the 
following preferences and comprise a certain segment of the population. 
Voting group 1 (29% of the population) Pluto>Mickey>Goofy 
Voting group 2 (31% of the population) Mickey>Pluto>Goofy 
Voting group 3 (40% of the population) Goofy>Pluto>Mickey 
At the election, no one wins an absolute majority, and Pluto, with only 29% of the 
vote, is eliminated. In the run-off, Mickey faces Goofy and wins with 60% of the vote 
because the voters who initially voted for Pluto switch to Mickey. If we add up the vot-
ers' preference intensities, however, Pluto should have won the election because most 
voters preferred Pluto to Mickey. Because people behave strategically in response to the 
anticipated behavior of others, however, designing a voting system that actually reflects 
these preference intensities may well be impossible. 
11. For elegant summaries of Arrow's Theorem, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP 
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-40 (1991) and 
Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337. 
12. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 19 (1962). 
13. "I am going to suggest that we begin to view our American Constitution as 
nothing more or less than a set of basic institutions and practices designed to the best of 
our abilities for the purpose of attaining democratic values" (p. 3). 
14. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998). 
15. One might object that Dahl's criticism of our constitution is misplaced because 
we are a republic, not a popular democracy. Thus, to point out that our system falls short 
on measures of democracy simply states the trivially obvious. Dahl replies that it is the 
distinctions between a democracy and a republic that are trivial. In both kinds of systems, 
the value of political equality plays a central role. Organizing ourselves into a representa-
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Defining democracy is no easy task. Giovanni Sartori has 
argued persuasively that trying to define democracy as an ab-
stract concept produces nothing much more illuminating than 
statements like "democracy is the rule of the people."16 Defini-
tions of "democracy" and "democratic" may be best approached 
sidewise-by considering why democracy is sought as an ideal. 17 
According to Dahl, democracy is appealing because we accept as 
a fundamental moral principle that "the good of every human 
being" ought to be considered "as intrinsically equal to that of 
any other."18 By extension, governments "must" when making 
decisions "give equal consideration to the good and interests of 
every person bound by those decisions. "19 Skepticism that spe-
cially qualified guardians could be entrusted with the power of 
considering the good and interests of each person and imple-
menting policies that fulfill the general good leads us to this pru-
dential conclusion: Citizens of a state should treat each other for 
political purposes as if each were equally qualified to partici-
pate- "directly or indirectly through their elected representa-
tives" -in "making the policies, rules, laws, or other decisions 
that citizens are expected (or required) to obey" (p. 136). A be-
lief in the moral equality of each human therefore leads to the 
adoPction of the principle that Dahl refers to as "political equal-
ity" 0 (p. 135). A political system in which the people govern 
themselves according the principle of political equality is there-
fore a democratic one. 
Putting political equalitf into practice requires commitment 
to several other principles.2 First, democracy requires equality 
in voting, with each citizen's preference taken equally into ac-
count. Second, democracy must enable citizens to participate ef-
fectively in government. That is, each citizen should have ade-
quate, equal opportunities for expressing her preferences. Third, 
tive republic is a way of achieving democracy's upsides on a large scale, while buffering 
ourselves against some of democracy's downsides. 
I6. See SARTORI, supra note 12, at 17. 
I 7. Cf id. at viii (stating that his "concern [is] with the ideas and/or ideals that pro-
duce and preserve a democratic system"); id. at 225 (arguing that a "word like democracy 
acquires a definite, helpful, and usable meaning only if we remember that it is an abbre-
viation summarizing the acquisitions and values of a civilization"). 
I 8. DAHL, supra note 14, at 65. 
I9. !d. 
20. Moral skeptics need not be put off by Dahl's line of argument, for skepticism 
yields the same conclusion: because what is right and good cannot be proved or dis-
proved with certainty, each citizen's opinions on matters should be considered to have 
equal weight, for any other rule requires us to reject skepticism 
21. DAHL, supra note 14, at 84-86. 
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citizens should be able to act on enlightened understanding, 
which means that they ought to have sufficient time and oppor-
tunity to form considered judgments about policy preferences. 
Fourth, citizens should have final control of the political agenda. 
Citizens may delegate authority to others who make decisions in 
nondemocratic ways (such as regulatory agencies). But citizens 
must retain control over those decisionmakers' agenda. Finally, a 
democracy must allow all permanent residents to become citi-
zens and participate fully in the democracy. 22 The first condition 
is how political equality manifests itself in operation, and it is a 
prerequisite for all of the other conditions to exist. 
Dahl's criticism of the American constitution centers on the 
Constitution's failure to ensure political equality and indeed on 
its enshrinement of institutions designed to ensure voter inequal-
ity. These antidemocratic institutions, Dahl argues, were 
adopted for reasons that have no relevance for us today, and 
thus have no claim to legitimacy. 
How has our constitution enshrined the principle of voter 
inequality? Well, as already noted, in presidential elections, citi-
zens in small states have a greater say on a per-capita-basis in 
who becomes president than citizens of larger states (Appendix 
B, Figure 2, "Unequal Representation in the Electoral Col-
lege"). Most dramatically, however, the Senate gives each state 
an equal voice in Congress regardless of its population. This too 
distorts democracy by giving states with small populations power 
completely disproportionate to their numbers- Wyoming's 
493,782 people have two Senators, the same as California's 
thirty-four million people (p. 50).23 The Senate's composition is 
insulated from the democratic process as well. The Constitution 
guarantees that no state will be stripped of its equal representa-
tion in the Senate without its consent, which no state will ever 
g1ve. 
Our constitution creates a government with other undemo-
cratic features as well. The Constitution created the Supreme 
Court as an unelected body with life tenure, but it did not clearly 
define what the judiciary's powers would be. Justice John Mar-
22. /d. 
23. Because each state has at least one representative in the House, there is a 
smaller bias in favor of residents of small states in that house of congress as well. A citi· 
zen in Wyoming has 132% of the voting power of a California citizen in the House of 
Representatives. (One member of the House for Wyoming's 494,000 citizens compared 
to one representative for every 651,377 California citizens) (derived by author from 2000 
Census data).) 
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shall helpfully stepped in to fill that breach. Finally, the Consti-
tution granted Congress only limited powers. This too checks 
democracy by artificially limiting the scope of the people's 
power as expressed through their congressional representa-
tives?4 The Constitution used to be even less democratic, of 
course, and most constitutional amendments in the last 150 years 
have sought to cure the most obvious defects-securing univer-
sal suffrage regardless of race, sex, or wealth, 25 and ensuring the 
direct election of Senators. 
AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ARE WE AT LEAST 
UNDEMOCRATIC IN A USEFUL WAY? 
In short, our federal government isn't terribly democratic at 
all. Indeed, Dahl argues that the American system is the least 
democratic when compared to the other longstanding democra-
cies in the world.26 Implicitly conceding that no governmental 
scheme can be perfectly democratic, Dahl argues our govern-
ment might still claim legitimacy if it provides a useful govern-
mental framework. He proposes five criteria for judging a sys-
tem's utility. First, a constitution must help maintain a stable 
government. Citizens cannot govern themselves if the country 
constantly threatens to fly apart or if the military poses a credi-
24. Things used to be much worse, and Dahl catalogs the nondemocratic elements 
of the Constitution as it was originally adopted. Originally, the Constitution allowed 
slavery, did not empower Congress to forbid it, made the fugitive slave laws part of the 
constitution itself, and gave slave states an electoral advantage in the House and in the 
Electoral College by adding 3/5 of every slave to a state's population (pp. 15-20). The 
Framers did not even debate this final point. Clinton Rossiter argues that representation 
in the Congress of 1783 had apportioned representatives according to the 3/5 rule, and 
consequently, "most northern delegates must have realized ... that [the 3/5 rule] would 
be the minimum price of Southern acceptance." CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND 
CONVENTION 173 (1966). 
25. It took five constitutional amendments to provide the constitutional basis for 
universal suffrage: the Thirteenth Amendment (1865) banned slavery, the Fifteenth 
Amendment (1870) declared that the right to vote could not be denied because of race; 
the Nineteenth Amendment (1920!) guaranteed women the right to vote, the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment (1964) banned poll taxes, and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (1971) 
extended the right to vote to persons eighteen and over. But as we all know, the constitu-
tion was not enough to guarantee African Americans' right to vote; "nearly two centu-
ries" elapsed "before a president and Congress could overcome the effective veto of a 
minority of states in order to pass" the Voting Rights Act in 1965 "to guarantee the vot-
ing rights of African Americans" (p. 16). 
26. Dahl compares us to twenty-two other countries that have continuously had a 
democratic government since at least 1950 (Appendix B Table 1). They are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Dahl does not include India 
because Indira Gandhi's 1975 coup interrupted its democratic rule. 
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ble danger to civil government. Second, a constitution must pro-
tect fundamental democratic rights, by which Dahl means basic 
civil liberties like freedom of speech and of the press (p. 97). 
Citizens must have these liberties to understand and weigh in on 
political issues (Dahl's "enlightened understanding") and to 
have some influence over the political agenda. Third, it must en-
sure democratic fairness among citizens-that is, it should count 
each citizen's concerns as equal.27 Fourth, it must help form de-
mocratic consensus. Fifth, it must create a government embody-
ing these characteristics that can also solve problems effectively. 
Unfortunately, Dahl isn't able to draw many conclusions 
about how our constitution, or any other constitution for that 
matter, makes government more or less useful. The world's old-
est twenty-two democracies have been stable enough that Dahl 
cannot say whether a particular constitutional scheme makes 
democratic governments more or less stable. Instead, stable gov-
ernments look to be possible within a broad range of constitu-
tional arrangements (pp. 93-94). Nor is he comfortable with say-
ing that particular kinds of constitutions protect democratic 
rights like freedom of the speech and press better than others. 
Instead, Dahl attributes different levels of protection of rights 
and liberties to "national histories, political cultures, and percep-
tions of internal and strategic threats to survival" (p. 99). He 
thinks that the protection of civil liberties depends wholly "on 
the beliefs and culture shared by its political, legal, and cultural 
elites and by the citizens to whom these elites are responsive" (p. 
99). 
It is also hard to say whether particular constitutional struc-
tures make governments more or less able to solve problems, 
mostly because it's hard to measure how good or bad a govern-
ment is at problem solving (pp. 116-18). The only evidence that 
Dahl points to is that divided government-when the legislative 
majority is of a different party than the executive-stacks the 
deck against drafting and passing important legislation (p. 111). 
Over the last century, we have usually had divided government, 
but most of the major waves of legislative change-the New 
Deal, the Great Society programs, and the civil rights laws of the 
1960s-have generally all occurred during periods of united gov-
ernment. (The one exception, the Reagan tax cuts of 1981, was 
27. DAHL, supra note 14, at 65. This principle of political equality is a supplement 
to the more general moral principle that "[w]e ought to regard the good of every human 
being as intrinsically equal to that of any other." !d. 
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passed when Republicans controlled the Senate and the Presi-
dency but the Democrats still held the House.) But the fact that 
divided government makes sweeping legislative change very dif-
ficult doesn't really address Dahl's criterion. We would still need 
to know whether our constitutional structure makes it more 
likely that we will have divided government, whether during pe-
riods of divided government a majority wants some problem 
fixed that the federal government does not address, and whether 
the legislation passed during periods of unified government ac-
tually alleviate the problems they are designed to fix. Unfortu-
nately, Dahl doesn't ask these questions, much less answer them. 
And if sweeping change contradicted democratic requirements, 
such as with anti-sedition laws in World War I, or the USA Pa-
triot Act, one would hardly say the ability to pass legislation 
made the government more democratic. 
Dahl can draw conclusions with regard to two of his criteria. 
First, he argues persuasively (and for the intuitive position) that 
our first-past-the-post system for determining the winner of con-
gressional and presidential elections does not promote consensus 
as well as proportional representation systems (pp. 104-05). In 
proportional representaticn systems, governments formed by 
parties that do not have an absolute majority in the legislature 
have to work with other parties to get legislation through (p. 
107). Interestingly, too, Dahl presents evidence that voters on 
the losing side in proportional representation systems (those 
who voted for nongoveming parties) reported greater satisfac-
tion with how their democracy worked than voters in majori-
tarian or first-past-the-post systems who came out on the losing 
end (pp. 107-09). 
This argument may be one of the most interesting and use-
ful parts of the book. As our country becomes less homogeneous 
and more diverse, we may want to consider proportional repre-
sentation more seriously. Dahl shows that we can- consistent 
with democratic principles-consider proportional representa-
tion alternatives to majority (or, if we're being accurate, plural-
ity) rule. The major substantive argument against proportional 
representation-that it tends to cement minority group prefer-
ences and thus impede the development of consensus-does not 
seem to hold much water in light of his evidence about high lev-
els of consensus in proportional representation systems. 
Dahl's central conclusion and criticism, however, is that our 
constitution flouts the principle of political equality or democ-
ratic fairness (pp. 99-100). Had our institutions of political ine-
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quality, such as the Senate, ever served a use (and Dahl is skep-
tical about that), Dahl is adamant that they have none now. Out 
of the twenty-two democracies he surveys, we have the one with 
the most unequal representation, largely due to the principle of 
equal representation of the states in the Senate and Electoral 
College. Even among democracies with federal systems, we still 
stand out on this score (p. 49). 
Dahl is quite right that there's no principled reason that our 
constitution sacrifices individual political equality for equal state 
representation. The Senate is a creature of political necessity, 
not of principle. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
knew exactly what they were sacrificing, and it horrified many of 
them. Dahl quotes Alexander Hamilton who inveighed against 
giving states equal representation: 
As states are a collection of individual men which ought we to 
respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or the 
artificial beings resulting from the composition. Nothing could 
be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former 
to the latter. It has been sd. that if the smaller States renounce 
their equality, they renounce at the same time their liberty. 
The truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty. Will the 
men composing the small States be less free than those com-
posing the larger (p. 13-14)?8 
Given the serious, substantive objections to equal state represen-
tation, why did the delegates permanently enshrine it in our con-
stitution? 
Because they had to. The small states29 absolutely refused to 
consider a constitutional system that did not give them equal 
representation in the legislature.30 States and their citizens, it 
seems, became accustomed to voting on matters concerning the 
28. Citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 466 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966). 
29. The most ardent proponents of equal state representation were New Jersey, 
Delaware, Connecticut, and New York. Yes, New York was a smallish state in the 1780s, 
less than half the size of Virginia, and smaller than North Carc>lina. Its leaders (with the 
significant exception of Alexander Hamilton) also worried about conceding power to the 
federal government and thought that equal state representation would help limit the fed-
eral government's powers. See ROSSITER, supra note 24, at 93. 
30. The opposition to creating a legislature that was elected on a purely per capita 
basis actually ran much more broadly than these four states. Rhode Island refused to 
send a delegation to the Constitutional Convention, and New Hampshire's delegates 
missed the critical votes on the design of the federal legislature. Rossiter asserts quite 
reasonably that these states would have been loath to ratify a constitution without some 
provision for equal state representation in the federal legislature. ROSSITER, supra note 
24, at 189. 
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states collectively as states. Small states, moreover, feared that 
without a guarantee of equal representation, Virginia's represen-
tatives would have a free hand to run the federal government. 
(On this score, the Senate didn't precisely save them from Vir-
ginia's power, as four of the first five presidents were Virgini-
ans.) It's possible too that Virginia's alacrity in introducing the 
first proposal for the Constitution heightened the small states' 
anxiety. (Virginia had proposed a bicameral national legislature 
in which representation in both houses would be per capita and 
representation would be based on both the free and slave popu-
lation.)31 
Even without Virginia's piggy proposal, the small states 
would never have agreed to a legislature elected on a purely per 
capita basis, because they did not have to. The small states held 
the entire convention in a classic hold-out situation. Members of 
the Constitutional Convention wanted a constitution that citizens 
in every state would ratify, and they needed a constitution that at 
least three-quarters of the states would. The Senate's composi-
tion and the constitutional guarantee that no state could be de-
prived of its equal vote in the Senate were the "rent" the small 
states exacted. 
In Dahl's eyes, for political inequality to be a legitimate part 
of a democratic system it must protect some bona fide interest 
from attack by a democratic majority. I take this principle to ap-
ply more generally to any deviations from his five criteria of de-
mocracy within any system claiming to be democratic. An exam-
ple of a justifiable deviation is Germany's ban of the Nazi party. 
This ban certainly limits Germans' associational and free speech 
rights, but it made perfect pragmatic sense for that country as it 
tried to forge a democracy in the shadow of the Third Reich. 
With regard to our violations of the principle of political 
equality, Dahl thinks small states have no valid claim to special 
protection. In the first place, they never had any real "need to be 
protected from federal laws passed by congressional majorities 
that would violate their rights and interests" (p. 50).32 He is 
surely right that residents of small states have little in common 
other than their lack of population, and it is true that the two 
smallest states, Delaware and Rhode Island, had few (if any) 
common substantive interests. 
3!. !d. at 169-70. 
32. "Why ... geographical location [should] endow a citizen or group of citizens 
with special rights and interests'' leaves Dahl "baffled" (p. 52). 
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If states did have common interests/3 a principled justifica-
tion for equal state representation would still have to explain 
why the people of these states deserve to speak in a dispropor-
tionately loud voice in the national legislature. The only possible 
justification for the Senate's composition I can think of-to §ive 
state governments representation in the national legislature 4 -
disappeared when the Seventeenth Amendment secured direct 
election of Senators. This "democratization" of the Senate has 
ironically decreased its "utility as an instrument of democratic 
government," to use Dahl's terminology. Now the Senate is just 
a more exclusive and less democratic version of the House. 
As a native of California, I have great sympathy for Dahl's 
arguments for political equality. I can't fault his reasoning or his 
conclusion that equal representation of states at the expense of 
individual representation has no principled basis. Nevertheless, 
Dahl's argument misses a fundamental point. The United States 
simply would never have existed but for this constitutional com-
promise. The United States was created out of former colonies 
that had been governed independently of one another; represen-
tatives of these independent state governments drafted the Con-
stitution. The Constitutional Convention asked all states to give 
up some of their independence to the federal government. The 
small states felt as though they had compromised as much as 
they could- and perhaps more than their constituents would 
consent to-by agreeing to per capita representation in the 
House and to the supremacy of the federal government. Clinton 
Rossiter explains: 
The Great Compromise [of equal representation of states in 
the Senate] was a confirmation of the states as states, as 
communities that had never been and never would be 
sovereign nations, and yet always had been and still meant to 
be discrete, self-conscious, indestructible units of political and 
social organization. It was also a confirmation of the Union as 
a union, as a nation that was more than a tight confederacy of 
sovereignties that shared a common destiny, and yet less than 
a consolidation of malleable components .... Dr. Johnson of 
Connecticut, went to the root of the matter with the help of 
George Mason by reminding Paterson that America was, for 
many purposes, "one political society" composed of individu-
33. In fact, today the smallest states-Alaska, Montana, North and South Dakota, 
and Wyoming-have a lot of common interests. All are predominately rural, frontier states, 
and four of them neighbor each other and have cattle-ranching as a major industry. 
34. For example, to prevent the federal government from saddling the states with 
unfunded mandates. 
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als, and by reminding Madison that the states, too, were po-
litical societies with "interests" all their own.35 
643 
Dahl spends little time discussing the history behind the 
Constitution's compromises, which is understandable-his pro-
ject, after all, is assessing the Constitution's current legitimacy as 
a governing document. Ultimately, however, this narrow focus 
compromises this book's analysis. His emphasis on current justi-
fications at the expense of historical justifications causes him to 
overlook what is probably the reason why we hold our constitu-
tion, with all of its flaws, in such high esteem and why there is lit-
tle pressure to change its fundamentals. 
This nation almost did not happen because of the dispute 
over power between the large and the small states.36 The small 
states considered the Senate's composition to be a deal breaker. 
Had we not compromised this aspect of individual equality for 
equal state representation, we would never have become the 
world's first modern democracy.37 We also could not have re-
mained a loose confederation of states. The delegates to the 
convention all agreed that the Articles of Confederation were 
completely unworkable and had to go. Had the convention 
failed, what is now the United States likely would have become 
independent state governments, or three nations or confedera-
cies, perhaps with the New England states, the mid-Atlantic 
states, and the Southern states each banding together. One hesi-
tates to roam in the realm of counterfactuals, but one thing 
35. ROSSITER, supra note 24, at 193. 
36. Clinton Rossiter relates an incident late in the Constitutional Convention. Ed-
mond Randolph, a Virginia delegate, was exasperated that the convention was about to 
compromise the principle of equal representation of individuals in favor of equal repre-
sentation of states in the Senate (and not coincidentally, also dilute the power of resi-
dents of large states in the legislature) by the narrowest of margins: five votes for the 
compromise, four against, and one abstention. He moved that the convention adjourn so 
that the "large states might consider the steps proper to be taken in the present solemn 
crisis of the business, and that the small states might also deliberate on the means of con-
ciliation." William Paterson of New Jersey, one of the strongest supporters of equal state 
representation, agreed, perhaps with too much alacrity and vehemence. He concurred 
"that it was high time for the Convention to adjourn," the rule requiring the delegates to 
keep the discussion secret should "be rescinded, and our constituents should be con-
sulted." The small states, he said, would not join in union with the others unless the con-
stitution guaranteed equality of the states. "If Mr. Randolph would reduce to form his 
motion for an adjournment sine die [a complete adjournment of the convention], (Mr. 
Paterson] would second it with all his heart." !d. at 194. The next day, the large states 
largely conceded this issue.ld. at 196. 
37. This statement certainly proves too much. The continued existence of slavery 
was also a precondition to union, but that fact was not a reason to retain those provisions 
in the constitution. The Civil War did not exact too high a price to banish slavery from 
our Constitution and country. 
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seems safe to hazard. United, and with an assist from John Mar-
shall, the states created the world's first "free trade zone," which 
Europe has envied, emulated, and still struggles to achieve. The 
fact that our farming regions could sell their crops without duties 
to industrial regions (and vice versa) and labor could move 
freely to wherever demand for workers was greatest meant that 
we became one of the most prosperous nations on earth. Be-
cause trade among citizens of different states (both in labor and 
goods) was so easy and cheap, we could take advantage of Ri-
cardo's principle of comparative advantage, with different areas 
of the country specializing in the commercial activity each was 
best at.38 
Were we to begin anew, I am skeptical that we would have 
the political will to fashion a different constitution that is signifi-
cantly more democratic or egalitarian. States continue to be an 
important organizing feature in our country, and it is hard to 
imagine that two hundred years into our history as a country that 
people would favor a radical reorganization of the basic federal 
structure of our government. Dahl also fails to convince me that 
the costs involved in fashioning a completely new (and surely 
imperfect in new and unexpected ways) constitution to cure ex-
isting defects would be worth the candle. So long as we are 
committed to remaining one united country, any new constitu-
tion would run into the same kinds of coordination problems 
that the framers faced with the first-though of course with dif-
ferent state players. One can imagine, for example, that Califor-
nia, Texas, New York, and Florida would insist on constitutional 
provisions that favored them as large states. As the sixth largest 
economy in the world and the largest agricultural producer in 
the United States, California could demand on provisions that 
favored it backed up with a credible threat of independence. 
Dahl could have spent more time considering the less obvi-
ous ways that our constitution might actually enhance democ-
racy. One obvious possibility is that by implicitly reserving broad 
powers to the states, the federal constitution leaves room for 
more participatory democracy on a broad range of subjects at 
the state level. Where Congress does not legislate or cannot leg-
islate, the states have plenary authority to do so. All state gov-
ernments have legislatures that are elected entirely on a per cap-
38. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION (Dutton 1%5 (1911)). 
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ita basis,39 and the Constitution ensures that they will be "repub-
lican" governments. As citizens' ability to influence policies is 
inversely related to the size of the government, citizens necessar-
ily have more access, power, and influence at the state level than 
at the national level. States may thus compensate for some of the 
democratic flaws of the federal government's design. 
Dahl's inattention to states means that he overlooks that 
states may function as "polyarchic" institutions in our federal 
system. In other works, Dahl has stressed that "polyarchic" insti-
tutions are an essential feature of a large-sc~le functioning de-
mocracy. These institutions are organizations formed by indi-
viduals around particular political or social interests. Political 
parties are the most obvious examples of polyarchic institutions, 
but so are interest groups like the Sierra Club and labor unions 
and community organizations like churches. These institutions 
are important because they act as mediators between govern-
ment institutions and individuals, giving members information 
about policies and communicating members' wants to govern-
ment institutions. In a large-scale democracy, like ours, these 
polyarchic institutions are essential because individuals quite 
simply lack the time, resources, and interest necessary to be ex-
perts on all political matters (and it would be exceedingly ineffi-
cient for each individual to do so). Polyarchic institutions also 
channel and concentrate the power of their individual members, 
which enable these groups and their members to gain some lev-
erage in and access to the political process over issues important 
to them.40 
While Americans today probably do not feel as intensely 
loyal to their home states as the Framers did, identification with 
one's home state is an important part of most Americans' iden-
tity. States, too, have distinct cultures and economic structures, 
and those differences affect both the kinds of policies that indi-
viduals support and the kinds of policies that actually work at 
the state level. While the principle of equal representation of 
states may be non-democratic in one sense, it has likely sup-
ported the evolution of states into institutions that can act as in-
termediaries between individuals and the federal government. 
39. Thanks to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964). 
40. Ronald A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation, and Opposition in DEMOCRACY: A 
READER 124 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds., 2001). 
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WHERE CAN WE Go FROM HERE? 
Eighth grade civics class taught us all that amending the 
Constitution is extraordinarily difficult. Amending the Constitu-
tion to cure the political inequality defects that Dahl identifies is 
practically impossible. Constitutional amendments to repeal the 
Electoral College predictably die in the Senate shy of the two-
thirds supermajority (p. 87-88), which makes the likelihood that 
three-quarters of the states would ratify such an amendment 
zero. The Senate's composition is not going to change, either. 
Dahl expresses pessimism that nonconstitutional changes to 
the Electoral College would be any more popular. His main sug-
gestion is that states could adopt either the Nebraska or the 
Maine model (p. 86-87). In those states, electors are appointed 
by district, with each district having one electoral vote. The two 
remaining electoral votes go to the highest (plurality) vote getter 
in the state. Dahl points out that early in our history, many states 
selected electors in this manner. It has only been in this century 
that most states have instituted the first-past-the-post winner-
takes-all rule. 
The Nebraska/Maine Model presents several advantages 
over the winner-takes-all rule that could make it attractive to a 
number of states. First, states that changed to a per district elec-
toral system would be less likely to be considered "safe" states-
states that one presidential candidate is nearly certain to win. 
Our three largest states are "safe" states. California and New 
York have voted for Democrats for president by large majorities 
in 1992, 1996, and 2000. Texas has been a "safe" state for 
Republicans for a couple of decades now. The existence of 
"safe" states means that Republican presidential candidates 
haven't really bothered to campaign in California or New 
York-they visited these states rarely and did not run many ad-
vertisements. And Democrats haven't really bothered with 
Texarhat our three largest states are "safe" means that presiden-
tial candidates didn't have to play to more than a third of our 
population during the campaign. In a game for the most elec-
toral votes, candidates predictably spend their resources where 
they have a real chance losing or winning by a small majority (or 
plurality). More than presidential-candidate face-time is at stake. 
Candidates make campaign promises to their allies in key, con-
tested states in return for their vocal and active support during 
the election and in getting out the vote. Florida has gotten many 
goodies and policy concessions over the past three years from 
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the Bush administration.41 We persist in irrational policies such 
as the trade embargo with Cuba because Cuban refugees are an 
important bloc in an important state; if they had instead immi-
grated to Arkansas, we would have been smoking Havana cigars 
and vacationing in Cuba years ago.42 Some of the smallest states 
(which theoretically benefit from the electoral college system) 
are the safest. The five states with only three electors each (the 
minimum possible number), Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and Wyoming, have all been "safe" Republican 
states since at least the 1970s. Hawaii, with four electoral votes, 
has traditionally been a safe state for Democrats. 
Candidates predictably expend few resources on these 
states during the elections (unless there was a contested senate 
seat, as there was in 2000 in South Dakota for Tom Daschle's 
seat). Changing to the Nebraska/Maine process does not amelio-
rate the Electoral College's basic political inequality, for small 
states still have a disproportionately large vote in the College it-
self. But any change from winner-take-all systems enhances de-
mocracy-winner-take-all systems discourage third-parties from 
forming, and in safe states winner-take-all reduces voters' incen-
tives to vote. 
Dahl overlooks another change that we could make that 
would make our elections for nationwide office more democ-
ratic. Perhaps the least "democratic" method for determining 
winners is the first-past-the-post rule, according to which the 
candidate with the plurality of the vote wins an office or the 
state's electoral votes. All states award their electoral votes to 
the plurality winner, and most states use the same rule to deter-
mine winners for seats in Congress. There is an important practi-
cal reason for having a first-past-the-post rule. Runoffs are im-
possible in presidential elections as the Constitution provides 
41. Blaine Harden, National and State Politics Help Protect a Swamp, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 3, 2002, at Al (stating that the Bush administration backed the National Park Ser-
vice plan to restrict access to off-road vehicles in the Everglades to sway "green" voters 
to vote for President Bush in 2004); Elisabeth Burniller & Carl Hulse, U.S. May Buy 
Back Florida Oil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,2002, at Al (reporting that the federal gov-
ernment would buy oil and gas rights to the Everglades and to Florida panhandle 
beaches in order to protect three wildlife preserves in Florida as part of the Bush admini-
stration's bid to help Jeb Bush win reelection as Florida's governor). 
42. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis & Eric Schmitt, Bush Faces Pressure from Con-
gress to Alter Cuba Policy, N.Y. TiMES, May 20, 2002, at A4 (reporting that President 
Bush intended to toughen restrictions on trade and travel to Cuba as part of a strategy to 
court Cuban voters seen as crucial to his election in 2000, despite calls from some leaders 
in Congress to ease restrictions). 
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that elections will take place on one day. And for other nation-
wide races, run-offs are expensive and cumbersome. 
Technology, however, makes automatic or instant run-off 
voting (IRV) systems possible. Australia has -;uccessfully imple-
mented such a system to elect its Lower House, and the Repub-
lic of Ireland uses IRVin its presidential elections. Under such a 
system, voters rank candidates in order of preference, and in the 
first vote, each voter's first preference is tallied. If no candidate 
wins an absolute majority according to the first ranking, then all 
candidates save the top two vote-getters are dropped, and those 
candidates' votes go to their supporters' second preference. This 
is a change that does not favor or disadvantage small or large 
states; it also does not advantage or disadvantage early or late 
adopters. This fact makes it a possible, practical method for 
making our elections more democratic, and possibly more excit-
ing (which could help voter turnout.) 
COULD A, SHOULD A, WOULDA? 
This book risks being a desultory coulda-shoulda-woulda 
nag. One unlikely event saves it. The war in Iraq. Ultimately, 
Dahl's message seems to this reader to be that constitutions are 
culturally, geographically, and historically contingent documents, 
and democracies come in at least thirty-one flavors. Any country 
that holds its own constitution out as a model for other countries 
does no one any favors. As we help to build a new Iraq and ad-
vise Iraqis as they write a new constitution, we should keep this 
message in mind. It could be a mistake, for example, to insist on 
a presidential democracy for Iraq as opposed to a parliamentary 
system. Iraq's history presents ample reasons to be suspicious of 
investing authority in one individual over executive functions 
like law enforcement and the military. At the least, Iraqis might 
have a particular resistance to viewing such political arrange-
ments as trustworthy and legitimate. On the other hand, evi-
dence that Ira~'s judiciary had something of an ethos of ~ud~c~al 
independence4 could mean that our unusual system of JUdicial 
review might work well. Additionally, Iraq's ethnic and religious 
divisions make Dahl's discussion about when constitutions may 
legitimately sacrifice democratic ideals like political equality 
quite topical. Dahl points out that a political system can protect 
43. See Richard Coughlin, In Iraq A Judicial System Worth Saving, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26,2003, at Al3. But see Bernard Weinraub, Aftereffects: Law: U.S. Seeks Solid Core 
to Fix Iraq's Broken Legal System, N.Y. nMES, Apr. 27,2003, § 1, at 24. 
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a minority's interests without employing our approach of giving 
a minority (in our case, small states) an equal voice on all issues. 
A constitution can protect minority interests on particular sub-
jects (like free exercise of religion or free association) by com-
pletely insulating those interests from majority rule (our Bill of 
Rights' approach). A constitution that provides for proportional 
representation might also protect a minority's interests by re-
quiring a supermajority in order to pass laws in particular subject 
areas to ensure that minorities consent to regulation in that area. 
This latter approach has the advantage of flexibility, as the con-
tours of a minority's particular interests and concerns may 
change over time. Proportional representation could also, as 
Dahl discusses, have the corollary advantage of promoting func-
tional working relationships among ethnic and religious groups. 
In the final analysis, we can be proud of our constitution, 
but Dahl gives us a number of cogent reasons to feel humble 
about it. At the very least, as a country that likes to think of itself 
as a beacon of democracy to the rest of the world (and hopefully 
as a transmitter of democracy to Iraq), we ought to resist the 
temptation to generalize the universal from our particulars. 
